The United States and China are
on a collision course in the Western Pacific. Far sooner than
once anticipated, China will achieve effective military parity
in Asia, general conventional parity, and nuclear parity. Then
the short road to superiority will be impossible for it to
ignore, as it is already on its way thanks to a brilliant
policy borrowed from Japan and Israel.
That is, briefly, since Deng
Xiaoping, China has understood that, without catastrophic
social dislocation, it can leverage its spectacular economic
growth into X increases in per-capita GDP but many-times-X
increases in military spending. To wit, between 1988 and 2007,
a tenfold increase in per-capita GDP ($256 to $2,539) but a
21-fold purchasing power parity increase in military
expenditures to $122 billion from $5.78 billion. The major
constraint has been that an ever increasing rate of technical
advance can only be absorbed so fast even by a rapidly
modernizing military.
Meanwhile, in good times and in
bad, under Republicans and under Democrats, with defense
spending insufficient across the board the United States has
slowed, frozen, or reversed the development of the kind of
war-fighting assets that China rallies forward (nuclear
weapons, fighter planes, surface combatants, submarines, space
surveillance) and those (antisubmarine warfare capacity,
carrier battle groups, and fleet missile defense) that China
does not yet need to counter us but that we need to counter it.
We have provided as many
rationales for neglect as our neglect has created dangers that
we rationalize. Never again will we fight two major adversaries
simultaneously, although in recent memory this is precisely
what our fathers did. Conventional war is a thing of the past,
despite the growth and modernization of large conventional
forces throughout the world. Appeasement and compromise will
turn enemies into friends, if groveling and self-abasement do
not first drive friends into the enemy camp. A truly strong
country is one in which people are happy and have a lot of
things, though at one time, as Edward Gibbon describes it in
"The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," "So rapid were the
motions of the Persian cavalry," that the prosperous and
relaxed citizens of Antioch were surprised while at the
theater, and slaughtered as their city burned around them. And
the costs of more reliable defense and deterrence are
impossible to bear in this economy, even if in far worse times
America made itself into the greatest arsenal the world has
ever known, while, not coincidentally, breaking the back of the
Great Depression.
China is on the cusp of being
able to use conventional satellites, swarms of miniature
satellites, and networked surface, undersea, and aerial cuing
for real-time terminal guidance with which to direct its 1,500
short-range ballistic missiles to the five or six aircraft
carriers the United States (after ceding control of the Panama
Canal and reducing its carrier fleet by one-third since 1987)
could dispatch to meet an invasion of Taiwan. In combination
with antiship weapons launched from surface vessels,
submarines, and aircraft, the missile barrage is designed to
keep carrier battle groups beyond effective range. Had we built
more carriers, provided them with sufficient missile defense,
not neglected antisubmarine warfare, and dared consider
suppression of enemy satellites and protections for our own,
this would not be so.
Had we not stopped production of
the F-22 at a third of the original requirement, its 2,000-mile
range and definitive superiority may have allowed us to
dominate the air over Taiwan nonetheless. Nor can we "lillypad"
fighters to Taiwan if its airfields are destroyed by Chinese
missiles, against which we have no adequate defense.
With the Western Pacific cleared
of American naval and air forces sufficient to defend or deter
an invasion, Taiwan—without war but because of the threat of
war—will capitulate and accept China's dominion, just as Hong
Kong did when the evolving correlation of forces meant that
Britain had no practical say in the matter. If this occurs, as
likely it will, America's alliances in the Pacific will
collapse. Japan, Korea, and countries in Southeast Asia and
even Australasia (when China's power projection forces mature)
will strike a bargain so as to avoid pro forma vassalage, and
their chief contribution to the new arrangement will be to rid
themselves of American bases.
Now far along in building a
blue-water navy, once it dominates its extended home waters
China will move to the center of the Pacific and then east,
with its primary diplomatic focus acquisition of bases in South
and Central America. As at one time we had the China Station,
eventually China will have the Americas Station, for this is
how nations behave in the international system, independently
of their declarations and beliefs as often as not. What awaits
us if we do not awake is potentially devastating, and those who
think the subtle, indirect pressures of domination
inconsequential might inquire of the Chinese their opinion of
the experience.
In the military, economic, and
social trajectories of the two principals, the shape of the
future comes clear. In 2007, a Chinese admiral suggested to
Adm. Timothy J. Keating, chief of U.S. Pacific Command, that
China and the United States divide the Pacific into two spheres
of influence. Though the American admiral firmly declined the
invitation, as things go now his successors will not have the
means to honor his resolution, and by then the offer may seem
generous.
None of this was ever a
historical inevitability. Rather, it is the fault of the
American people and the governments they have freely chosen.
Perhaps five or 10 years remain in which to accomplish a
restoration, but only with a miracle of leadership, clarity,
and will.
(Mr. Helprin, a senior fellow at
the Claremont Institute, is the author of, among other works,
"Winter's Tale" (Harcourt), "A Soldier of the Great War"
(Harcourt) and, most recently, "Digital Barbarism"
(HarperCollins).)